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To the extent that one person construes 
the construction processes of another, he 
may play a role in a social process involv-
ing the other person. 
G.A. Kelly 
 
As many of you know, I am not a psychologist. I 
came to PCP through rhetoric; more specifically, 
through the initiators of the Western rhetorical 
tradition, the Sophists, who, not entirely coinci-
dentally, also happened to inaugurate another 
tradition, that of radical constructivism. At the 
most abstract level a conference, about any 
topic, is a rhetorical occasion. Because the con-
ference participants have so much in common, 
the rules which apply are those of what ancient 
rhetorical theory calls epideictic or ceremonial 
oratory: basically, the orator is supposed to high-
light and celebrate what she and the audience 
have in common; this, of course, is a great way 
of strengthening social bonds but is not necessar-
ily conducive to learning. In organising this ple-
nary session, my intention was to question this 
construction: I wanted the speakers to share their 
experience about constructs they and the audi-
ence probably did not have in common.  
When I learned that Maria Armezzani would 
be unable to attend and wondered how to fill her 
place at extremely short notice, it occurred to me 
that I might push the envelope of this format by 
sharing my own experience of some conse-
quences of a fundamental tenet of PCP which 
probably most of my audience had never envi-
sioned, and which would strongly question their 
anticipations. My own anticipation about this is 
that our discussion will be lively. I very much 
look forward to it. 
 
We all know how controversial Darwin's theory 
of evolution was when it first appeared. The 
reason is that, before Darwin, the relationship 
between humans and other animals was based on 
the idea of the Scala naturae, the Great Chain of 
Being (Figure 1). The natural world was as-
sumed to be organized hierarchically: in creating 
the world, God was thought to have established 
for all eternity the categories of beings it was to 
contain, and to have assigned to each category a 
place, above or beneath other categories. This 
meant that all beings (dogs, trees, kings, cows, 
priests, ants, algae, farmers, lions…) were part 
of an eternal, immutable hierarchical order man-
dated by God. This, of course, was the founda-
tion not only of the subjection of all non-humans 
to man, who was conceived to have been made 
in the image of God, but also of absolute monar-
chy, and of the division of society into estates 
with hugely different rights and duties. 
Politically, this vision was overthrown by the 
Enlightenment and by the French revolution; but 
scientifically it was only seriously questioned 
when Darwin replaced the Great Chain of Being 
with the Tree of Life (Figure 2). The Tree of Life 
is a genealogical tree; it shows that all life forms 
on our planet make up one big family; just like 
in a family, there are differences between the 
various branches, but no hierarchy. According to 
Darwinian theory, which is the foundation of the 
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life sciences today, mankind is not the crown of 
creation but simply one animal species among 
innumerable others. Each species has peculiari-
ties setting it apart from others (we attend con-
ferences, dolphins use sonars from navigation, 
spiders spin webs…), but the common origin of 
all species implies that all traits which we con-
sider uniquely human, from intelligence to emo-
tions, to the ability to communicate, to attach-
ment to loved ones, are actually shared with 
other animals. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Scala naturae 
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Figure 2: The Tree of Life 
 
 
 
 
Carmen Dell’Aversano 
76 
Personal Construct Theory & Practice, 14, 2017 
 
We are accustomed to thinking that we can cor-
rectly gauge the extent to which other animals 
possess these traits through observation and ex-
periment, and that this makes us able to evaluate 
them objectively, and to decide fairly how they 
should be treated; this is the basis on which most 
decent people, people who would never harm 
another human, who find all forms of discrimi-
nation and oppression repulsive, and who de-
nounce them fearlessly whenever they come 
across them, people who spend their lives trying 
to help others, decide that it is morally unobjec-
tionable to consume animal products.  
However, from a PCP/PCT viewpoint, this is 
a fiction, for at least two reasons. The first is a 
consequence of the sociality corollary, which 
clearly states that, in the case of animals as for 
any other subject, all we can know is not the 
reality of their emotions, intelligence or abilities, 
but only our own construction of their construc-
tion processes; as a consequence, our evaluation 
of them is by definition not objective, and any 
decision based on that evaluation is completely 
arbitrary. The other reason is the intrinsic in-
commensurability of all construct systems: PCT 
assumes that there is, and there can be, no ‘ob-
jective’ outer vantage point from which an im-
partial all-knowing subject can judge all possible 
construct systems and rank them in a hierarchy 
from worst to best, and consequently from least 
to most deserving of respect; in a PCT perspec-
tive there are no ‘lives not worth living’1; there 
are only faulty, superficial or tendentious con-
structions of others' construct systems. And that 
our customary construction of some animals as 
‘lives not worth living’ is actually far from ra-
tional is shown by the fact that most ‘happy meat 
eaters’ in the West would be horrified at the 
prospect of eating a cat or dog, even though our 
shared scientific construction of these animals' 
emotions, intellect, and abilities makes it impos-
sible to draw any meaningful distinction between 
                                                 
1
 The phrase ‘lebensunwertes Leben’ was used by the 
Nazis in order to justify the killing of a number of 
segments of the population. This has, of course, no 
bearing on the completely separate issue of the 
evaluation of one's own life, which, together with its 
practical consequences, is a prerogative of each indi-
vidual subject. 
them and other animals whose flesh we consume 
unthinkingly, like pigs or sheep
2
  
 
I had probably better make clear that I am not 
saying that animals are in any way ‘equal’ to 
humans
3
; one important reason is that, in a PCT 
framework, this claim would be meaningless, 
since equality, as is clear from the Construction 
corollary
4
, is a collusive concept, which can only 
be employed by choosing to disregard differ-
ences and to concentrate on what we decide to 
construe as shared traits; therefore, animals 
could only be perceived as ‘equal’ by someone 
who had already decided to consider them 
‘equal’, and thus to disregard the traits which 
they do not share with humans, and to focus on 
those that they do. But just as important is the 
consideration that assuming ‘equality’ with us, 
however defined, to be a prerequisite for the 
enjoyment of the most basic rights, such as the 
                                                 
2
 One piece of evidence among many is the Cambridge 
Declaration on Consciousness (2012) which states, 
among other things, that ... 
 
Convergent evidence indicates that non-human ani-
mals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and 
neurophysiological substrates of conscious states 
along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behav-
iours. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates 
that humans are not unique in possessing the neuro-
logical substrates that generate consciousness. Non-
human animals, including all mammals and birds, 
and many other creatures, including octopuses, also 
possess these neurological substrates. 
 
http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclaration
OnConsciousness.pdf 
 
3
 Nor, indeed, to one another: indeed, the very "hu-
man/animal" construct, which lumps together bono-
bos and clams, tapeworms and dogs in the contrast 
pole to "humans", obscuring the fact that, for exam-
ple, humans are vastly more similar to all other 
mammals than other mammals are to any inverte-
brates, is obviously incompatible with a clear and 
rigourous understanding of Darwinism, and therefore 
with the theory and practice of the life sciences as 
Western culture has conceived of them for the last 
160 years. 
 
4
 “A person anticipates events by construing their 
replications” 
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right to live and not to be tortured (which are 
routinely denied to animals), is only possible if 
we believe ourselves to be the ultimate embodi-
ment of objective value. I could not imagine a 
less constructivist position.  
This completely unconstructivist position is, 
however, the foundation of our attitude towards 
animals in science, in ethics, and in legal mat-
ters. When we study animals, we take ourselves 
as a reference point; not surprisingly, animals are 
always found wanting, and this is supposed to 
justify our using them in such a way that their 
lives are routinely sacrificed to our convenience, 
tastes and whims
5
. In its most basic, but also 
clearest form, the argument on which human 
exploitation of animal rests goes like this: we 
can do anything to them because they are not 
like us. The sole epistemological and ethical 
foundation of human use of other animals is 
egocentrism.  
 
This is the point at which, in my research, in my 
experience, and in my life, PCP/PCT meets 
Critical Animal Studies (CAS). CAS is a new 
hybrid field which studies the relationships of 
humans with nonhumans with a view to expos-
ing the power dynamics implicit in them. It is a 
hybrid field not only because it exists at the 
crossroads of a number of disciplines, from 
ethology to anthropology to sociology, but also 
because it blends scholarship and activism. Part 
of my work in CAS focuses on the critique of a 
realistic epistemology, which maintains that we 
can know animal natures objectively and there-
fore that we have a right to decide what is mor-
ally permissible to do to other animals; the phi-
losophical foundation of my critique is 
PCT/PCP. Basically, once we start regarding the 
relations between humans and animals in a PCT 
perspective, we realise that our construction of 
other animals is oppressively preemptive and 
stiflingly constellatory, and that those modes of 
construing are not only intellectually unsound 
but also ethically pernicious and politically irre-
sponsible, since the less we understand about 
                                                 
5
 Frans B. M. De Waal, Are we smart enough to 
know how smart animals are?, New York, 
Norton, 2016. 
 
other animals, the more we believe we have a 
right to torture and kill them. The limits of our 
empathy are set by our ignorance. They may be 
very narrow indeed. 
 
As we all realise, one important consequence of 
the Sociality corollary (which need not only be 
applied to the therapeutic relationship) is to 
make us less egocentric: taking the Sociality 
corollary seriously means to realize that, because 
we are enmeshed in social relationships, the 
consequences of our constructions are, to some 
extent, always for others to bear. Indeed, my 
own definition of power in PCP terms is “the 
extent to which the consequences of our con-
structions must be borne by others”. Believing 
that humans can fly and throwing myself out of 
the window is one thing; believing that humans 
can fly and being in a position to throw other 
people out of the window systematically and 
with impunity is quite another. Because the rela-
tionship of our species with other species is a 
relationship of absolute power, if we consider it 
through the lens of the Sociality Corollary, we 
become aware that the way we construe the con-
struction processes of other animals frames them 
in a role that is always oppressive, and most 
often leads to their torture and killing. Just as 
knowledge is never objective or impersonal, it is 
also never ethically or politically neutral: our 
construction of their construction processes is 
invariably aimed at maintaining and extending 
our power. 
Thus we take pride in investigating animal 
cognition and emotions scientifically, but it is a 
foregone conclusion that nothing we can find out 
about them will ever lead us to question our ab-
solute domination; of course this makes our sci-
entific investigations absolutely unscientific. 
Even the staunchest Darwinians often behave as 
if they still believed in the Great Chain of Being; 
even the most sincere Kellyans often behave as 
if the Sociality Corollary did not exist, mistaking 
their construction of other animals' construction 
processes for the reality of these processes, 
which in a PCP perspective are actually by defi-
nition unknowable. If we are willing to take 
Kelly, and the Sociality corollary, seriously, we 
should be willing to ask the question which a 
great scholar, not of ‘animal behaviour’ but of 
animal minds, Frans de Waal, has chosen as the 
title of the book which crowns his long career: 
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“Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart 
Animals Are?” [6] 
And we should also be aware of the fact that, 
despite de Waal's optimism, the only possible 
answer for us as Kellyans is, by definition, "No". 
Are we going to make something of this? 
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